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Abstract
The deployment of control systems with network-connected components has made feedback control systems vulnerable to attacks over
the network. This paper considers the problem of intrusion detection and mitigation in supervisory control systems, where the attacker has
the ability to enable or disable vulnerable actuator commands and erase or insert vulnerable sensor readings. We present a mathematical
model for the system under certain classes of actuator enablement attacks, sensor erasure attacks, or sensor insertion attacks. We then
propose a defense strategy that aims to detect such attacks online and disables all controllable events after an attack is detected. We
develop an algorithmic procedure for verifying whether the system can prevent damage from the attacks considered with the proposed
defense strategy, where damage is modeled as the reachability of a pre-defined set of unsafe system states. The technical condition of
interest that is necessary and sufficient in this context, termed “GF-safe controllability”, is characterized. We show that the verification of
GF-safe controllability can be performed using diagnoser or verifier automata. Finally, we illustrate the methodology with a traffic control
system example.
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1 Introduction
The increasing amount of networked components in feed-
back control systems has made these systems vulnerable to
cyber threats. Since control systems are often safety critical
(e.g., avionics, power grid), it is imperative to embed de-
fense mechanisms into them (Cardenas et al., 2008; Baner-
jee et al., 2012).
In this paper, we consider the closed-loop control system
architecture of Figure 1, where the plant is controlled by the
supervisor through sensors and actuators in the traditional
feedback loop. The communication channels for the sensor
and actuator signals are often unprotected, allowing attackers
to potentially inject false sensor or actuator signals.
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Fig. 1. The closed-loop control system architecture
We consider event-driven supervisory control systems where
the plant is abstracted as a discrete event system. The super-
visor monitors the plant behavior through the events gener-
ated by the sensors and it dynamically issues enable/disable
actuator commands in order to enforce a given specification.
We study the problem of intrusion detection and mitigation
for control systems under four classes of attacks: Actuator
Enablement attacks (AE-attacks), Actuator Disablement at-
tacks (AD-attacks), Sensor Erasure attacks (SE-attacks) and
Sensor Insertion attacks (SI-attacks). Specifically, in an at-
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tack scenario, some actuators or sensors are deemed vul-
nerable and the attacker can change the actuator commands
(from disable to enable or vice-versa) or change the sen-
sor readings (by erasing a genuine sensor event or inserting
a fictitious one). We address the problem of protecting the
system from reaching a pre-defined set of unsafe states un-
der each of the above attack scenarios. Note that in general
actuator attacks or sensor erasure attacks are not directly ob-
servable, while inserted fictitious sensor events are assumed
to be indistinguishable from genuine ones for the supervi-
sor. We leverage results from supervisory control and fault
diagnosis of discrete event systems and propose a defense
strategy that detects attacks online and disables all control-
lable actuator events after detecting an attack with certainty.
This defense strategy may not be sufficient in general to
prevent damage. Hence, we characterize a property termed
General Form of safe controllability (GF-safe controllabil-
ity for short) that precisely captures the capability of pre-
venting the system from reaching an unsafe state after an
attack, using the proposed defense strategy. Here, GF stands
for AE, SE, or SI. An algorithmic procedure is developed to
verify whether the system is GF-safe controllable. For this
purpose, diagnoser or verifier automata can be employed.
The key feature distinguishing this work from the large
amount of work in cybersecurity is our focus on closed-
loop control systems. We adopt a model-based approach to
precisely capture the vulnerabilities and the effects of an at-
tack on the control system. The model-based approach en-
ables a formal characterization of the unsafe behavior that
an attacker tries to induce and the resiliency that the sys-
tem defender wants to achieve. The model-based approach
also allows for monitoring deviations from the normal sys-
tem behavior. Our work is complementary to the works on
anomaly/intrusion detection in cyber systems (e.g., Lazare-
vic et al. (2005); Hoffman et al. (2009); Zhou et al. (2010);
Modi et al. (2013)) where detection is based on statistical
analysis of network packets, for instance. We do not focus
on how attackers infiltrate vulnerable actuators or sensors,
but rather on the detection of attacks and on the modeling
of their effects on the control system. Under each of the
four types of attacks considered, we adopt a fairly simple
attack model which can be paraphrased as “attack whenever
possible”. However, our methodology is general and more
sophisticated attack models could be embedded in it. Simi-
larly, our defense strategy upon detection of attacks is based
on “safety first”, by switching to a “safe mode” of operation,
but more refined defense mechanisms could be embedded
in our modeling methodology, if so desired.
Intrusion detection and prevention in the setting of supervi-
sory control of discrete event systems have been previously
studied in Thorsley and Teneketzis (2006), where the au-
thors consider the design of a supervisor that achieves the
specification both in normal operation and after an attack.
The focus in Thorsley and Teneketzis (2006) is on finding
language conditions under which the supervisor can prevent
unsafe behavior in the presence of attacks while achieving a
given specification, using a notion called disable language,
which shares several similarities with the safe controllabil-
ity condition used in this paper. Our focus is more explicit
than Thorsley and Teneketzis (2006) in terms of modeling
several classes of attacks, detecting them algorithmically us-
ing diagnoser automata, and switching to safe mode upon
detection. The problem of intrusion detection and preven-
tion is related to fault tolerant supervisory control problems,
a well-studied problem in the literature (see, e.g., Rohloff
(2005); Nke and Lunze (2011); Paoli et al. (2011); Sulek
and Schmidt (2014); Wen et al. (2014); Moor (2015)), where
a robust supervisor is designed to maintain the specifica-
tion even when the system becomes faulty. Our approach is
closest to the work in Paoli et al. (2011), where the authors
consider a strategy that detects faults online and reconfig-
ures the control law when a fault is detected. Our notion
of GF-safe controllability is a GF-attack variant of the safe
controllability property introduced in Paoli et al. (2011).
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we
present a mathematical model for supervisory control sys-
tems under AE-attacks and propose a defense strategy that
detects attacks online and, upon detection with certainty, dis-
ables all controllable events in order to prevent attack dam-
age. We define the property of AE-safe controllability that
characterizes the system’s capability to prevent damage un-
der AE-attacks and develop algorithmic procedures for ver-
ifying AE-safe controllability using diagnoser and verifier
automata. Next, we consider other types of attacks. We only
briefly discuss AD-attacks and focus instead on SE- and SI-
attacks. Paralleling the case of AE-attacks, we model the
effect of SE- and SI-attacks on the control system. For AE-
and SE- attacks, we consider a worst-case scenario where
the attacker may attack at every opportunity. For SI-attacks,
we consider an attack strategy where the attacker never in-
serts a sensor reading that is not defined in the current state
of the nominal supervisor. We then generalize AE-safe con-
trollability to GF-safe controllability, the property that the
system should satisfy in order to successfully prevent dam-
age from either AE-, SE- or SI-attacks, and finally we de-
velop a test to verify GF-safe controllability. In the case of
SE- and SI-attacks, in addition to testing the corresponding
version of GF-safe-controllability, it is also necessary to test
if the control system under attack has a deadlock.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We de-
fine the types of attacks we deal with in Section 2. Section 3
introduces our mathematical framework. Section 4 studies
the effect of actuator enablement attacks. Then, in Section 5,
we define the property of AE-safe controllability and discuss
its verification. We present the model of the system under
sensor erasure and insertion attacks in Sections 6 and 7, re-
spectively. In Section 8, we define the property of GF-safe
controllability and present an algorithm for its verification.
Finally, in Section 9, we illustrate our methodology with a
traffic control system example and in Section 10, we con-
clude the paper.
A preliminary and partial version of the results in Sections
4 and 5 was presented in Carvalho et al. (2016). The results
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in Sections 5.4, 6, 7, and 8 are new.
2 Types of attacks
We depict in Figure 2 the attack model under consideration.
The control system architecture under attack has a plant G
equipped with a set of potentially vulnerable sensors and
actuators, and G is controlled by a partial-observation su-
pervisor (or P-supervisor) SP . Let E be the event set of G.
The actuators are modeled by the set of controllable events
Ec, with Ec ⊆ E, while the sensors are modeled by the
set of observable events Eo, with Eo ⊆ E. The supervisor
observes the occurrences of the plant’s observable events
through projection Po from set E to set Eo. The attacker,
represented by block A, has access to subsets of Ec and
Eo, representing vulnerable actuators and sensors and de-
noted by Ec,v ⊆ Ec and Eo,v ⊆ Eo, respectively. The sets
Ec,v and Eo,v are predefined based on system knowledge
and are application dependent. They can, for example, re-
flect the capability of the attacker to exploit vulnerabilities
of the system. Finally, block GD is the module that detects
attacks, which we call the intrusion detection module.
G
GD
SP
Po
A
+/− +/− Eo
Ec
Ec,v
Eo,v
Fig. 2. The control system architecture under attack
The fact that the attacker can compromise either sensors or
actuators is captured by the two outputs of A that affect: (i)
the actual observations of SP and GD, which consist of the
genuine sensor readings affected by the attacks on them; and
(ii) the actual control actions that are applied to G, which
consist of the combination of the genuine control actions of
SP with those of A. The combination of the attacks of A
with genuine sensor readings and genuine control actions
are denoted by the two +/− blocks in Figure 2. This +/−
is a conceptual operation and represents the following four
types of attack of A considered herein:
AE for Actuator Enablement: A “overrides” a control ac-
tion of SP on a particular controllable event in Ec,v , by
enabling an event that is currently disabled by SP ;
AD for Actuator Disablement: A “overrides” a control ac-
tion of SP on a particular controllable event in Ec,v , by
disabling an event that is currently enabled by SP ;
SE for Sensor Erasure: A “erases” an occurrence of an ob-
servable event in Eo,v , thereby making that occurrence
unobservable to SP and GD;
SI for Sensor Insertion: A “inserts” a fictitious occurrence
of an observable event in Eo,v to the observation stream
of SP and GD.
Hereafter, we assume that SP has already been designed and
is fixed. The goal is to design GD to detect and mitigate
attacks by A in each of the four above cases. The attack
model of A that is considered by GD will be discussed in
each case.
3 Mathematical framework
We consider plants modeled as deterministic finite-
state automata. An automaton is denoted by G =
(X,E, f, x0, Xm), where X is the finite set of states, E is
the finite set of events, f : X ×E∗ → X is the (potentially
partial) transition function, x0 is the initial state, and Xm is
the set of marked states. For the sake of simplicity, the set of
marked states will be omitted unless blocking is considered.
The language generated by G is the set of strings defined by
L(G) := {s ∈ E∗ : f(x0, s) is defined} and the language
marked by G is Lm(G) := {s ∈ E∗ : f(x0, s) ∈ Xm}.
Consider event set E′ ⊆ E and state x ∈ X; the set of
reachable states with respect to E′ and x is defined as
Reach(G, x,E′) = {x′ ∈ X : (∃s ∈ E′∗)[f(x, s) = x′]}.
The active event set of G at state x is denoted by ΓG(x).
As was mentioned above, E is partitioned as E = Eo∪˙Euo,
where Eo and Euo denote, respectively, the sets of ob-
servable and unobservable events; similarly, E = Ec∪˙Euc,
where Ec and Euc denote, respectively, the sets of con-
trollable and uncontrollable events. When an event σ ap-
pears in string s, we write σ ∈ s. Similarly, we write
Ec ∈ s whenever s has an event in Ec. The natural projec-
tion Po : E∗ → E∗o is defined such that (i) Po(ε) = ε; (ii)
Po(σ) = σ if σ ∈ Eo; (iii) Po(σ) = ε if σ ∈ Euo; and (iv)
Po(sσ) = Po(s)Po(σ) for s ∈ E∗ and σ ∈ E, where ε de-
notes the empty string. Given s ∈ E∗o , the inverse projection
of t is P−1o (t) = {s ∈ E∗ : Po(s) = t}. Both the projec-
tion and the inverse projection operations are extended to
languages by applying Po(s) and P−1o (s) to all strings in
the language. We write s′ < s when s′ is a strict prefix of
s. Given L ⊆ E∗, we define L/s := {t : st ∈ L}, which is
the set of all suffix strings in L after s.
When it is necessary to restrict the behavior of G in order
to satisfy some performance specification K ⊆ L(G), we
introduce a feedback control loop together with a supervi-
sor. We consider specifications defined in terms of admissi-
ble sublanguages of L(G). The supervisor dynamically en-
ables or disables events of the plant (Ramadge and Wonham,
1989), restricting the closed-loop behavior within the admis-
sible language. In general, the plant is partially observable
and thus the supervisor decides which events to be disabled
based on the projections of strings generated by G. More
specifically, a supervisor under partial observation is a map-
ping SP : Po[L(G)]→ 2E ; for every string s generated by
G, the supervisor makes its decision based on Po(s). As a
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consequence, two different strings s1 and s2 with the same
projection lead to the same control action. Such a supervisor
is referred to as a P-supervisor, and the resulting controlled
system is denoted by SP /G.
We say that sublanguage K of L(G) is controllable with
respect to L(G) and Euc if KEuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K. Also, K
is observable with respect to L(G), Po and Ec if for all
s ∈ K and σ ∈ Ec, sσ /∈ K and sσ ∈ L(G) implies that
P−1o [Po(s)]σ ∩K = ∅. It is well-known that controllability
and observability are necessary and sufficient for the exis-
tence of a supervisor that enforces K (Wonham, 2013).
4 Actuator enablement attacks
This section and the next one consider a supervisory control
system with vulnerable actuators. Specifically, we consider
an attack scenario where the attacker has infiltrated a set of
vulnerable actuators and overrides “disable” control actions
from the supervisor by “enable” actions for the compromised
actuators. The goal of the attacker is to use these “enable”
control actions to potentially drive the system to an unsafe
state. We call such attacks Actuator Enablement attacks, or
AE-attacks for short.
To represent the AE-attack model in Figure 2, the combi-
nation of the control actions of the supervisor SP and the
attacker A (+/− block) is to be interpreted as the OR oper-
ation on the control actions (i.e., enabled events) of SP and
those of the attackerA. Recall that the set of vulnerable actu-
ator events is denoted by Ec,v , which is a subset of Ec. The
vulnerable actuator events in Ec,v can be either observable
or unobservable. Our methodology accounts for both cases.
The attacker potentially observes the same set of observable
events through Po as the system does (this is left unspeci-
fied), and it can override the supervisor’s control actions on
vulnerable events. Ignoring attacks, the closed-loop behav-
ior is L(SP /G) = K, where K is a controllable and ob-
servable sublanguage of L(G). That is, SP is the “nominal”
supervisor that was designed to enforce K. It may or may
not be resilient to attacks; this is what we wish to determine.
Module GD receives the occurrences of observable events
through projection Po and its goal is to infer the presence of
AE-attacks. When such a detection occurs with certainty, we
adopt the simple defense model thatGD forces SP to switch
from enforcing K to a safe mode, where all controllable
events are permanently disabled. In the development that
follows, we assume that GD has no prior knowledge of the
attack model ofA, soGD will consider thatA can potentially
override every disable command to a vulnerable actuator;
in other words, GD assumes a worst-case attack scenario.
But other attack scenarios could be considered by suitably
altering the modeling methodology presented next.
The simple defense strategy of disabling all controllable
events corresponds to “expect the worst and put safety first”.
Our primary focus in this paper is to develop a precise model
for various types of attacks in supervisory control systems
and to understand the effects of such attacks. This problem
does not appear to have been studied in this formal man-
ner in the literature. Since this is the objective of this work,
we have adopted the simple and conservative “safety first”
approach to defend attacks, and have left the refinement of
our methodology to account for more sophisticated defense
mechanisms, as well as other issues such as blocking, for
future work.
We now describe how to model the closed-loop system un-
der the above scenario of an AE-attack; then we will show
how to design the intrusion detection module GD in Section
5. We employ two operations in our modeling methodol-
ogy: dilation and compression (Carvalho et al., 2012; Alves
et al., 2014). These operations are useful for modeling the
attacker’s actions. In order to do so, let Eac,v = {σa : σ ∈
Ec,v} denote the set of attacker’s events on vulnerable actu-
ators, which we will refer to as attacked actuator events and
define Ea = E ∪Eac,v . The dilation operation is a mapping
D : E∗ → 2E∗a with the following properties: (i) D(ε) =
{ε}; (ii) D(σ) = {σ} if σ ∈ E\Ec,v; (iii) D(σ) = {σ, σa}
if σ ∈ Ec,v; and (iv)D(sσ) = D(s)D(σ) where s ∈ E∗ and
σ ∈ E. The compression operation recovers a string s from
a dilation string in E∗a . It is a mapping C : E
∗
a → E∗ such
that (i) C(ε) = ε; (ii) C(σ) = σ, if σ ∈ E; (iii) C(σa) = σ,
if σa ∈ Eac,v; and (iv)C(saσ) = C(sa)C(σ) where sa ∈ E∗a
and σ ∈ Ea. Both the dilation and the compression opera-
tions can be extended to languages by applying them to all
strings in the language. That is, D(L) =
⋃
s∈LD(s) and
C(La) =
⋃
sa∈La C(sa).
We present in Algorithm 1 the construction of the closed-
loop system under AE-attacks. Consider the plant G and let
H be the finite-state automaton realization of supervisor SP .
Recall that the realization of a partial-observation supervi-
sor captures in its active event set the current set of enabled
events; in particular, enabled unobservable events are cap-
tured by self-loops at the current state of H .
First, we construct Ga by adding to G all possible attacker
actions using the dilation operator D on L(G). For a transi-
tion labeled by σ ∈ Ec,v on G, we add in parallel a transi-
tion labeled by σa to represent an AE-attack. This captures
an attack by A on each transition representing a vulnerable
actuator event.
Next, we build Ha, the overall supervisor under the effect
of AE-attacks. Specifically, we take the supervisor realiza-
tion H and add self-loops to all of its states with events in
Eac,v , when the compression of the candidate event is not in
the active event set of the state. These self-loops for attack
events model the attacker’s ability to enable attacked actu-
ator events, when those events are disabled by SP . In addi-
tion, to capture the fact that a supervisor should never dis-
able an uncontrollable system event, we also add self-loops
for every uncontrollable event, when these events are not in
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the active event set of the state. Indeed, after an AE-attack,
new occurrences of uncontrollable events could occur that
are not defined at the current supervisor state (since the plant
may have changed state unknown to the supervisor due to
an AE-attack).
Finally, we find the closed-loop system under AE-attacks,
GM , by parallel composing Ha and Ga. Automaton GM
models the behavior of the system in the presence of AE-
attacks on all vulnerable actuators at all times, which corre-
sponds to the worst-case scenario under consideration. For
simplicity, in the remainder of this paper, we will write LM
for L(GM ). Clearly, by construction of GM , LM will be a
controllable and observable sublanguage of L(Ga).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for AE-attack model
Inputs:
• G = (X,E, f, x0) and H = (XH , E, fH , x0,H) :
plant and supervisor realizations, respectively
• Eo, Ec and Ec,v : sets of observable, controllable and
vulnerable actuator events
Output: Closed-loop system under AE-attacks GM =
(XM , Ea, fM , x0,M )
1: Build Ga = (X,Ea, fa, x0), where fa(x, σa) :=
f(x,C(σa)) if f(x,C(σa)) is defined, ∀σa ∈ Ea,
∀x ∈ X
2: Build Ha = (XH , Ea, fHa , x0,H), where
fHa(xH , σ) =
fH(xH , σ), if fH(xH , σ) is defined
xH , if (σ ∈ Eac,v ∧ fH(xH , C(σ))
is undefined) ∨ (σ ∈ Euc∧
fH(xH , σ) is undefined)
3: Compute GM = Ha‖Ga
In GM , the only controllable events are those in Ec, since
the events in Eac,v are actions of the attacker and thus un-
controllable. Note that the events in Ec,v are indeed con-
trollable, but of course they can be overridden by the corre-
sponding events in Eac,v . Also, the observability properties
of the events in Eac,v are inherited from the corresponding
ones in Ec.
Example 1 We consider the plant G in Figure 3(a) with
Ec = Ec,v = {b}. State 4 is the unsafe state of the plant and
it is identifed with a square. The supervisor that controls G
is realized as automaton H in Figure 3(b). Notice that the
supervisor disables event b at state 2, thereby preventing the
plant from reaching unsafe state 4. Following Algorithm 1,
we build Ga in Figure 3(c) by adding a transition labeled
by ba in parallel with the transition labeled by b. We then
build in Figure 3(d) the realization of the supervisor under
AE-attacks by adding a self-loop for attacked actuator event
ba at every state; we also add self-loops for uncontrollable
events a and c when they are not in the active event set of
the state. Finally, we build in Figure 3(e) the closed-loop
1 2 3 4
a b c
(a) G: plant model
1 2
a
(b) H: supervi-
sor realization
1 2 3 4
a b c
ba
(c) Ga: plant subject to attack
1 2
a
ba, c a, ba, c
(d) Ha: supervisor realization in-
cluding the effects of the attack
(1,1) (2,2) (2,3) (2,4)
a ba c
(e) GM : closed-loop system under
attack
Fig. 3. Figures of Example 1
system under AE-attacks by GM = Ha||Ga. Each state in
GM is a pair where the first state is the supervisor state
and the second state is the plant state. We can see that, with
the attacker enablement of vulnerable actuator event b, the
plant can transition from state 2 to state 3 and then reach
unsafe state 4 through uncontrollable event c.
5 Detection and mitigation of actuator enablement at-
tacks
5.1 Detection and mitigation strategy
As we can see in Example 1, under AE-attacks, the plant
can deviate from the specification enforced by the supervisor
and reach an unsafe state. To mitigate the effects of such
attacks, our strategy is to design an attack detection module
and then switch to “safe mode” of operation when an attack
has been detected. This defense strategy may or may not be
sufficient to prevent the system from reaching a set of states
deemed unsafe. Our goal is to identify a condition under
which this defense strategy does work. We model the set
of unsafe states distinctly from the original specification K
achieved by SP . That is, while all states reached by SP /G
are assumed to be safe, not all states outside of those reached
by SP /G may be unsafe. We denote the set of unsafe states
by Xf . Xf is a subset of X that captures physical states
where damage to the plant would occur, for instance. Such
states can be determined from properties of the physical
system when the automaton model is developed.
Our techniques are adapted from techniques developed in
Paoli et al. (2011) for “safe controllability” and in Thorsley
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and Teneketzis (2006) for “disable languages”. Specifically,
with the model developed in the previous section, we for-
mulate the problem of attack detection as a fault diagnosis
problem, where the fault events are the attacker’s actions on
vulnerable actuator events. We design an intrusion detection
module that monitors the output from the plant and notifies
the supervisor when an attack has been detected (with cer-
tainty). The supervisor, upon receiving an attack report from
the intrusion detection module, switches to its safe mode of
operation where it disables all controllable events. We re-
mark that the attack detection together with the safe con-
trollability strategy derived here are also suitable for on-the-
fly implementations, since they rely solely on diagnosers,
which can be constructed on-the-fly (as opposed to synthe-
sized off-line).
5.2 AE-safe controllability
We define a variant of safe controllability from Paoli et al.
(2011) in the context of AE-attacks and call it AE-Safe
Controllability; it is formally defined in Definition 1 below.
Specifically, consider the set of unsafe states Xf ⊂ X . Let
Ψ(Eac,v) = {t ∈ L(G) : t = t′σ, t′ ∈ E∗a , σ ∈ Eac,v}
denote the set of strings for which the last event is an at-
tacked actuator event. Consider GM built in Algorithm 1
that models the closed-loop system subject to AE-attacks
and let XMf = {(xH , x) ∈ XM : x ∈ Xf} be the set of un-
safe states in GM . In words, AE-safe controllability holds
if we can detect any attack occurrence and then disable a
controllable event before the plant reaches an unsafe state.
For the purpose of the definition that follows, we define the
following projection: P ao : E
∗
a → (Eo ∪D(Ec,v ∩ Eo))∗.
Definition 1 (AE-Safe Controllability) Consider GM =
(XM , Ea, fM , x0,M ) from Algorithm 1. Language LM =
L(GM ) is AE-safe controllable with respect to projection
P ao , attacked actuator events E
a
c,v , and unsafe states X
M
f
if (∀s ∈ Ψ(Eac,v))(∀t ∈ LM/s) [(fM (xo, st)∩XMf 6= ∅)∧
(∀s′ < st, fM (xo, s′) ∩XMf = ∅)] ⇒ (∃t1, t2 ∈ E∗a)[(t =
t1t2) ∧
(
(@ω ∈ LM )[P ao (st1) = P ao (ω) ∧ Eac,v /∈ ω]
) ∧
(Ec ∈ t2)].
unsafe state
xf
σct1
t2t
σac,v
Attack detecteds
Fig. 4. Illustration of AE-safe controllability where σac,v ∈ Eac,v ,
t = t1t2, σc ∈ Ec, and xf ∈ XMf
We will sometimes slightly abuse terminology and say that
“systemG is AE-safe controllable” if the correspondingLM ,
P ao , E
a
c,v and X
M
f are understood and if Definition 1 holds.
Figure 4 illustrates the definition of AE-safe controllability.
The first state is reached through a string s whose last event
σac,v is an attacked actuator event. String t is the continuation
of s that reaches an unsafe state for the first time. AE-safe
controllable holds if for every such s and t, t can be written
as t = t1t2 where (1) the attacked actuator event can be
detected after st1 and (2) t2 contains a controllable event
in Ec. Recall that all events in Ec are controllable and that
events in Eac,v are uncontrollable in GM . That is, AE-safe
controllability holds if we can detect an attack occurrence
and then disable a controllable event before the plant reaches
an unsafe state; and this property has to hold for every attack
occurrence. It should be noted that the detection condition
after string st1 is that an attack has been detected on any
of the vulnerable actuators (cf. Eac,v /∈ ω in detection clause
in definition), not necessarily for the same event at the end
of string s; as long as module GD knows for sure that one
vulnerable actuator was indeed attacked, then it forces SP
to switch to safe mode.
The construction procedure of GM and the conditions in
the definition of AE-safe controllability lead directly to the
following result, whose proof is omitted.
Theorem 1 Under the attack and defense model considered
in this paper, system G will not reach an unsafe state if
and only if it is AE-safe controllable w.r.t. projection P ao ,
vulnerable actuator events Ec,v , and set of unsafe states
XMf .
5.3 Test of AE-safe controllability using diagnoser
To test if a system is AE-safe controllable, we develop an
algorithmic procedure that relies on diagnoser automata (or
simply, diagnosers). The diagnoser, as developed in Sam-
path et al. (1995), relies on the computation of the observer
of the automaton obtained by performing a parallel compo-
sition between the plant automaton and the so-called label
automaton that captures occurrences of faults, as described
in Cassandras and Lafortune (2008). Our algorithm verifies
if the diagnoser-based intrusion detection module can detect
any attack before the plant reaches an unsafe state and if
the supervisor can disable events to prevent the plant from
reaching Xf . Before we formally present the algorithm, we
first review the definition of the set of first-entered certain
states in a diagnoser from Paoli et al. (2011); the reader is
referred to Cassandras and Lafortune (2008) for the defini-
tion of diagnoser and any undefined terminology.
Definition 2 (Set of first-entered certain states) Let
Gd = (Qd, Eo, fd, q0,d) be the diagnoser constructed from
a given plant and the appropriate label automaton. Define
QY N = {q ∈ Qd : q is uncertain}, QN = {q ∈ Qd :
q is normal}, and QY = {q ∈ Qd : q is certain}. The set
of first-entered certain sates is FC = {q ∈ QY : (∃q′ ∈
QY N ∪QN ,∃σ ∈ Eo)[fd(q′, σ) = q]}.
We can now present Algorithm 2, the diagnoser-based al-
gorithm for testing AE-safe controllability. By construction
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of GM , we can see that our goal is to detect occurrences
of events in Eac,v in LM , based on observable event set
Ea,o; specifically, the attacked actuator events inEac,v are the
“fault” events to be diagnosed, and they are assumed to be all
of the same fault type. Hence, we wish to build the diagnoser
ofGM . In step 1, we consider the label automatonA` in Fig-
ure 5 and label the attacked actuator events Eac,v by building
G` = GM ||A`. We then compute in step 2 the diagnoser au-
N Y
Eac,v
Eac,v
Fig. 5. Label automaton A`
tomaton Gd = Obs(G`, Ea,uo), where Obs(G`, Ea,uo) de-
notes the observer of G` with respect to unobservable event
set Ea,uo, where Ea,uo = Euo ∪ D(Ec,v ∩ Euo). In step
3, we test if any uncertain state contains an unsafe state.
If this is the case, then the diagnoser cannot detect the at-
tack before the plant reaches an unsafe state; hence, AE-
safe controllability is violated. Next, we compute the set of
first-entered certain states FC and then verify in step 6 if
any state in FC contains an unsafe state. If this happens,
then even though the attack is detected, it already caused the
plant to reach an unsafe state; hence, the system is not AE-
safe controllable. Finally, we find the set of states reachable
from FC through uncontrollable or attacked actuator events,
and then test in step 10 whether this set contains any unsafe
state. If this happens, then even though the attack has been
detected, the plant can still uncontrollably reach an unsafe
state and is therefore not AE-safe controllable. In the algo-
rithm, q↓x := {x : (∃l)[(x, l) ∈ q]} is the projection of q to
the set of corresponding GM states.
Proposition 1 Consider GM = (XM , Ea, fM , x0,M ) from
Algorithm 1. Automaton Gd is the diagnoser built in Algo-
rithm 2. Language LM is not AE-safe controllable with re-
spect to P ao ,E
a
c,v , andX
M
f if and only if one of the following
conditions holds true:
(1) There exists qY N = {(xi1 , `i1), . . . , (xin , `in)} ∈
QY N such that ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xij ∈ XMf and
`ij = Y .
(2) There exists qY = {(xi1 , Y ), . . . , (xin , Y )} ∈ FC
such that ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xij ∈ XMf .
(3) There exists xM ∈ Xuc such that xM ∈ XMf , where
Xuc is defined in Algorithm 2.
Proof: Given in Appendix.
Note that the diagnoser will always immediately detect the
attacks on vulnerable events in σ ∈ Ec,v∩Eo, since the cor-
responding event σa is observable. However, in this case, the
plant may still reach an unsafe state via uncontrollable and
attacked actuator events, violating AE-safe controllability.
Algorithm 2 AE-safe controllability test using diagnoser
Inputs:
• GM = (XM , Ea, fM , x0,M ): closed-loop system sub-
ject to AE-attacks
• Xf : set of unsafe states
• Eac,v : set of attacked actuator events
Output: AESafeControllability ∈ {true, false}
1: Build G` = GM ||A`, where A` is shown in Figure 5
2: Compute diagnoser Gd = Obs(G`, Ea,uo), where
Ea,uo = Euo ∪D(Ec,v ∩ Euo)
3: if there is uncertain state q = {(xi1 , `i1), . . . , (xin , `in)}∈ QY N in which there exists xij ∈ XMf then
4: AESafeControllability = false
5: else Compute FC according to Definition 2
6: if there is q = {(xi1 , Y ), . . . , (xin , Y )} ∈ FC in
which there exists xij ∈ XMf then
7: AESafeControllability = false
8: else
9: Compute
Xuc =
⋃
q∈FC
⋃
xM∈q↓x
Reach(GM , xM , Euc ∪ Eac,v)
10: if Xuc ∩XMf 6= ∅ then
11: AESafeControllability = false
12: else AESafeControllability = true
Hence, the conditions in Definition 1 still need to be tested,
as described in Algorithm 2.
Example 2 Returning to Example 1, we show the closed-
loop system under AE-attacks in Figure 3(e). We follow Al-
gorithm 2 to test whether the system is AE-safe controllable.
In step 1, we build G` with respect to Eac,v = {ba} in Fig-
ure 6. Assuming Ea,uo = ∅ for simplicity, the diagnoser
is the same automaton as G`. By examining the diagnoser
states in Figure 6, we see that the attack will be detected
in diagnoser state ((2, 3), Y ), before the plant reaches un-
safe state 4. However, with the test in step 10, we find that
Xuc = {(2, 3), (2, 4)} contains unsafe state (2, 4). That is,
although the diagnoser can detect the attack before enter-
ing an unsafe state, since the supervisor cannot disable un-
controllable event c, the plant can still reach unsafe state
(2, 4) ∈ XMf under attack. Consequently, AE-safe control-
lability is violated.
((1,1),N) ((2,2),N) ((2,3),Y) ((2,4),Y)
a cba
Fig. 6. Automaton G`
5.4 Test of AE-safe controllability using verifier
Another way to verify language diagnosability is by using
verifier automata, or simply verifiers (Yoo and Lafortune,
2002; Shengbing et al., 2001; Moreira et al., 2011). The
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main advantage of verifiers over diagnosers is that their com-
putation requires polynomial time in the state space of the
automaton, while building diagnosers will have complexity
exponential in the number of states of the plant automaton
in the worst case. On the other hand, unlike diagnosers, ver-
ifiers are not suitable for online diagnosis.
Algorithm 3 tests AE-safe controllability using a verifier.
Step 1 of Algorithm 3 is the same as step 1 of Algorithm 2. In
step 2, verifierGV is built based on the methodology in Mor-
eira et al. (2011) (which is only briefly reviewed here).The
construction of GV starts by computing automata GN and
GF that model the normal and the faulty/attacked behavior
of the system, respectively. After obtaining GN (with state
space denoted by XN ), we rename its unobservable events
using the renaming function R : Ea \ Eac,v → ER, where
R(σ) = σ, if σ ∈ Ea,o and R(σ) = σR, if σ ∈ Ea,uo \Eac,v .
Thus, the unobservable events of GN and GF become “pri-
vate” events of these automata. In step 3, we test if any state
in verifier GV is an unsafe state. In step 5, we complete GV
by adding observable events to a new state A. This new state
marks a possible attack detection. For state A, only uncon-
trollable events are added, since after diagnosing the attack,
AE-safe controllability is violated if there exists a trace that
reaches an unsafe state through unobservable events only.
In step 6, GT tracks all traces that, after the attack has been
diagnosed, have only uncontrollable events in their contin-
uations; its state space is denoted by XT . In step 7, if GT
contains an unsafe state, then the attack can steer the system
to an unsafe sate before diagnosis of an attack.
Proposition 2 Let LM denote the language generated by
GM . Then, LM is not AE-safe controllable with respect to
P ao : E
∗
a → E∗a,o, Eac,v and XMf if and only if at least one
of the conditions holds true
(1) There exists xV = {(xN , N), (x, Y )} ∈ XV such that
x ∈ XMf , where xN ∈ XN and x ∈ XM .
(2) There exists {xcdV , (x, Y )} ∈ XT such that xcdV = A
and x ∈ XMf , where xcdV ∈ XcdV and x ∈ XM .
Proof: Given in Appendix.
Example 3 Returning again to example 1, the closed-loop
system subject to actuator enablement attacks is shown in
Figure 3(e) where the sets of observable, controllable, and
vulnerable actuator events are Eo = E, Ec = {b}, and
Ec,v = {b}, respectively. The normal and the faulty/attacked
behavior of the system GN and GF are depicted in Figures
7(a) and 6, respectively, and verifier GV is shown in Figure
7(b). According to Step 5 of Algorithm 3, it is necessary to
add a new stateA. All states ofGV are connected toA using
observable events a, b, ba and c (when these events are in
the active event set of the state). Also, it is necessary to add
self-loops at stateA for uncontrollable events a, ba and c, as
shown in Figure 7(c). After that, GT is built by computing
GcdV ‖GF as depicted in Figure 7(d). The system is not AE-
safe controllable according to step 7 of Algorithm 3, because
Algorithm 3 AE-safe controllability test using verifier
Inputs:
• GM = (XM , Ea, fM , x0,M ): closed-loop system sub-
ject to actuator enablement attacks
• Xf : set of unsafe states
• Eac,v : set of attacked actuator events
Output:
• SafeControllability ∈ {true, false}
1: Build G` = GM‖A`, where the label automaton A` is
shown in Figure 5
2: Build verifier automaton GV = (XV , ER ∪
Ea, fV , x0,V ) assuming Eac,v the set of fault events ac-
cording to Algorithm 1 in Moreira et al. (2011)
3: if there exists {(xN , N), (x, Y )} of GV such that x ∈
XMf then SafeControllability = false
4: else
5: Build GcdV = (X
cd
V , ER ∪ Ea, fcdV , x0,V ), where
• XcdV = XV ∪ {A}
• f cdV (xV , e) =
 fV (xV , e) , if e ∈ ΓV (xV )A , if e ∈ Ea,o ∧ e /∈ ΓV (xV )
• f cdV (A, e) = A for all e ∈ Euc ∪ Eac,v
6: Build GT = GcdV ||GF , where GF is defined in Al-
gorithm 1 in (Moreira et al., 2011)
7: if there exists {xcdV , (x, `)} in GT such that xcdV = A
and x ∈ XMf then SafeControllability = false
8: else SafeControllability = true
state {A, ((2, 4), Y )} in GT has, as components, state A
and (2, 4) ∈ XMf . Thus, the supervisor cannot prevent the
system from reaching an unsafe state after the system is sure
that an attack has occurred.
5.5 Discussion
Recall from Algorithm 1 that we model AE-attacks by
adding in the supervisor realization H a self-loop for every
σa ∈ Eac,v (unless the compression of σa is already in the
active event set of the state). The resulting automaton Ha
thus models an “all-out” attacker that always attacks the
vulnerable actuators. Subsequently, AE-safe controllability
is a property of whether the system can be protected under
such an all-out attacker. Now, we consider the question of
whether it is possible under “smaller” attacks, i.e., when the
attacker does not attack at all times, to inflict damage on
the system when AE-safe controllable holds. The following
proposition proves that AE-safe controllability with respect
to the all-out attacker implies AE-safe controllability with
respect to any attacker. Hence, testing AE-safe controllabil-
ity with respect to the all-out attacker is sufficient.
Proposition 3 Let LAA be the language of the closed-loop
system under the all-out attacker and LSA be that under an
attacker that does not attack at all times. If LAA is AE-safe
controllable with respect to Po, Eac,v and X
M
f , then LSA is
AE-safe controllable with respect to Po, Eac,v and X
M
f .
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((1,1),N) ((2,2),N)
a
(a) Non-fault automaton GN
{((1,1),N),((1,1),N)}
{((2,2),N),((2,2),N)}
a
(b) Verifier automaton GV
{((1,1),N),((1,1),N)}
{((2,2),N),((2,2),N)}
a a, ba, cA
b, ba, c
a, b, ba, c
(c) Verifier automaton GcdV
{{((1,1),N),((1,1),N)},((1,1),N)}
{{((2,2),N),((2,2),N)},((2,2),N)}
a
ba
{A,((2,3),Y)}
{A,((2,4),Y)}
c
(d) Automaton GT
Fig. 7. Figures of Example 3
Proof: Given in Appendix.
5.6 Actuator disablement attacks
We briefly discuss actuator disablement attacks (AD-
attacks), which correspond to the case where the fusion
block +/− in Figure 2 is the conjunction of the enabled
events of SP with those of A; that is, vulnerable actuator
events that are enabled by the supervisor can be disabled by
the attacker. In this case, the closed-loop behavior is further
restricted to a subset of K, since no new behavior of G can
be generated. Hence, no state in Xf is reachable. However,
blocking may occur, even if the closed-loop system SP /G
is nonblocking; an example can be easily constructed and
is omitted here. Clearly, the only motivation for A to select
such an attack is to cause blocking. We will not further
discuss this type of attack since it cannot lead to a violation
of safety, as described by Xf .
6 Sensor erasure attacks
In this and the next two sections, we discuss attacks on vul-
nerable sensors. We first consider the case of sensor era-
sure attacks, or SE-attacks. As illustrated in Figure 2, in
SE-attacks, the attacker A can “erase” an occurrence of an
observable event σ ∈ Eo,v to SP and Gd. Thus, enabled ob-
servable events inEo,v can be “subsumed” by corresponding
unobservable events that we label as the set Eao,v , thereby
causing confusion for both SP and GD. Hence, using Eao,v ,
the modeling of SE-attacks follows a similar procedure as for
AE-attacks in Algorithm 1, with some minor adjustments.
For the sake of clarity, the modified form of Algorithm 1 is
given in Algorithm 4. Note that the events in Eao,v are neces-
sarily unobservable and that their controllability properties
are inherited from the corresponding ones in Eo,v .
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for SE-attack model
Inputs:
• G = (X,E, f, x0): plant
• H = (XH , E, fH , x0,H) : supervisor realization
• Eo, Ec and Eo,v : sets of observable, controllable, and
vulnerable sensor events
Output:
• GM = (XM , Ea, fM , x0,m): closed-loop system sub-
ject to SE-attacks
1: Compute Eao,v = D(Eo,v)\Eo,v
2: Define Ea = E ∪ Eao,v and assign:• Ea,o = Eo
• Ea,uo = Euo ∪ Eao,v
• Ea,c = Ec ∪D(Eo,v ∩ Ec)
• Ea,uc = Euc ∪D(Eo,v ∩ Euc)
3: Build Ga = (X,Ea, fa, x0), where
• fa(x, σa) = f(x,C(σa)) if f(x,C(σa)) is defined,
∀σa ∈ Ea, ∀x ∈ X
4: Build Ha = (XH , Ea, fHa , x0,H), where• fHa(xH , σ) =
fH(xH , σ), if fH(xH , σ) is defined,
xH , if (σ ∈ Eao,v∧
fH(xH , C(σ)) is defined)
∨(σ ∈ Ea,uc ∧ fH(xH , σ)
is undefined)
5: Compute GM = Ha‖Ga
To explain the reasoning behind step 3 of the algorithm, we
make the following observations. The erasure of (enabled)
observable events means that the supervisor and G may be-
come “out of sync” from the original design of H; this is
why all uncontrollable events in Euc must be added at all
states of H , if they are not already there, to make sure that
controllability is never violated. The same reasoning applies
to all events in Eao,v that are uncontrollable, as the occur-
rence of an uncontrollable vulnerable event could be erased
by A. However, a controllable event in Eo,v will only be
erased, i.e., replaced by its corresponding event in Eao,v , if
it is enabled by Ha. In all cases, feasibility in G of the self-
loops added in Ha will be captured by the parallel com-
9
position Ha‖Ga. In this manner, the construction of GM
again captures the case where A may attack at every pos-
sible opportunity, i.e., it may erase every event output by a
vulnerable sensor.
Example 4 The state transition diagrams of system G and
supervisor realizationH are shown in Figures 8(a) and 8(b),
respectively, where Ec = {a, c} and E = Eo = {a, b, c}.
Let Eo,v = {b} be the set of vulnerable (to erasure) sen-
1 2 4
3
5
a b c
c
(a) G
1 2
3
a c
4b
(b) H
1 2 4
3
5
a
b
c
c
ba
(c) Ga
1 2
3
b, ba
a
c
b, ba ba
4b
b, ba
(d) Ha
(1,1) (2,2) (3,3)
(2,4) (3,5)
c
a c
ba
b
(4,4)
(e) GM
Fig. 8. Figures of Example 4
sor events. The set of unsafe states is Xf = {5}, marked
with a square in Figure 8(a). The erased sensor event set is
Eao,v = {ba}, thus the new set of events isEa = {a, b, c, ba}.
Following Algorithm 4, we build automaton Ga by adding
a transition labeled by ba in parallel with every transition
b, as shown in Figure 8(c). The realization of the supervisor
under SE-attacks is depicted in Figure 8(d). The closed-loop
system under SE-attacks is computed as GM = Ha‖Ga,
and it is shown in Figure 8(e). After the occurrence of event
a, the attacker erases the occurrence of event b and it be-
comes unobservable to the supervisor. Because of that, the
supervisor “thinks” that the plant is in state 2, but the plant
is actually in state 4. Then, the supervisor allows event c to
occur and the plant reaches an unsafe state.
The next example shows that SE-attacks can lead to block-
ing, when marked states are considered in G.
Example 5 Consider G and H in Figures 9(a) and 9(b),
respectively, where E = Eo = Ec. Let Eo,v = {b} and let
1 4 5
3
c b a
a
2
a
7
a
6
(a) G
1 4 5
3
c b a
a
2
a
6
(b) H
(1,1)
c b a
a
a
(4,4) (5,5) (6,6)
(2,2) (3,3)
(4,5)
ba
(c) GM
Fig. 9. Figures of Example 5
Xf = {7}. Following Algorithm 4, the closed-loop system
subject to SE-attacks is shown in Figure 9(c). When the
attacker erases event b, the plant gets stuck in state 5 as the
supervisor assumes the plant is in state 4.
7 Sensor insertion attacks
Sensor insertion attacks, or SI-attacks for short, can “insert”
a fictitious occurrence of an observable event σ ∈ Eo to the
observation stream of supervisor SP and intrusion detection
module GD. In order to model SI-attacks, let Eio,v = {σi :
σ ∈ Eo,v} denote the set of attacks by A on the vulnerable
sensors, which we will refer to as SI-attack onset events.
The case of SI-attacks is somewhat different from the attacks
previously considered in this paper, in that we need to be
more specific about the attack strategy of A. Namely, if A
inserts a fictitious event occurrence that is not defined at the
current state of H , either because the event is not currently
feasible in the state H thinks the system is in or because
it is currently disabled by SP , then A immediately reveals
its presence without gaining any benefit. Hence, it is only
advantageous for A to insert fictitious event occurrences
when H expects such observations. The goal of A in this
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case is to cause a change of control action for SP that would,
for instance, enable an event that was not currently enabled
in order to steer G towards an unsafe state. To resolve the
above issue, we will assume that in the case of SI-attacks, A
has a model of H and moreover A has the same observation
capabilities as SP ; hence,A knows at any time the exact state
of SP . Under this assumption, A will only insert fictitious
event occurrences when H expects that such an event could
have occurred.
The modeling of the closed-loop system under the above
considerations is obtained by executing Algorithm 5. Con-
sider plant G and supervisor realization H . First, we con-
struct Ga by creating a new state xjσfor each event σ ∈ Eo,v
at every state j of G, and a new event σi ∈ Eio,v that rep-
resents the onset of an SI-attack at that state of G. Next,
for each added state, we add two transitions: one from state
j to the new state xjσ labeled by σ
i ∈ Eio,v , and the other
from the new state xjσ to state j labeled by σ; the former
represents the onset of an SI-attack on the vulnerable sensor
of the plant whereas the latter represents the fictitious event
inserted by the SI-attack. This inserted fictitious event is as-
sumed to be indistinguishable from a genuine one by SP and
GD, which is why the latter transition is labeled by σ ∈ Eo.
Afterwards, we build automaton Ha that models the realiza-
tion of the supervisor under SI-attack. For this purpose, we
add a self-loop for (unobservable) event xσ at each state x
that has event σ ∈ Eo,v in its active event set. This ensures
that the attacker can insert any occurrence of any event in
Eo,v when such an event is feasible according to the original
design of H , which is consistent with the above-described
attack model. Moreover, to ensure controllability, we also
add at each state x a self-loop for every uncontrollable event
in Euc that is not already in the active event set of state x.
Finally, the closed-loop system subject to SI-attacks is ob-
tained by the parallel composition of Ha and Ga.
Remark 1 The events in Eio,v are unobservable and uncon-
trollable, as they represent the onset of an SI-attack. Hence,
we have that: (i) EM,o = Eo; (ii) EM,uo = Euo ∪ Eio,v;
and (iii) EM,uc = Euc ∪ Eio,v .
Example 6 Consider system G and of supervisor realiza-
tionH shown in Figures 10(a) and 10(b), respectively, where
E = Eo = Ec. Let Eo,v = {b} and Xf = {5}.
Following Algorithm 5, automaton Ga is built by adding
new states and transitions labeled by bi and b as shown in
Figure 10(c). The idea behind this procedure is that when
the SI-attack occurs, which is represented by event bi, the
attacker emulates the occurrence of event b in the plant G;
hence Ga does not reach a new state. The new set of events
is Ea = {a, b, c, bi}, where Ea,uo = {bi}. The realization
of the supervisor subject to SI-attacks is shown in Figure
10(d). SupervisorHa does not see the difference between the
fictitious inserted event b (after bi) and the real occurrence
of b (with no bi), hence it changes state in both cases. The
Algorithm 5 Algorithm for SI-attack model
Inputs:
• G = (X,E, f, x0) and H = (XH , E, fH , x0,H) :
plant and supervisor realizations, respectively
• Eo, Ec, and Eo,v : sets of observable, controllable,
and vulnerable sensor events
Output:
• GM = (XM , EM , fM , x0,m): closed-loop system
subject to SI-attacks
1: Ga ←BUILD-GA(G)
2: Ha ←BUILD-HA(H)
3: Compute GM = Ha‖Ga
4: function BUILD-GA(G)
5: Ga ← G
6: Ea ← E ∪ Eio,v
7: for every j ∈ X do
8: for every σ ∈ Eo,v do
9: Xa ← Xa ∪ {xjσ}
10: Add fa(j, σi) = xjσ
11: Add fa(xjσ, σ) = j
return Ga = (Xa, Ea, fa, x0)
12: function BUILD-HA(H)
13: Ha ← H
14: EHa ← E ∪ Eio,v
15: for all x ∈ XH do
16: Add fHa(x, σ
i) = x for all σ ∈ (ΓH(x)∩Eo,v)
17: Add fHa(x, σ) = x for all σ ∈ Euc \ ΓH(x)
return Ha = (XHa , EHa , fHa , x0,H)
closed-loop system under SI-attacks is computed as GM =
Ha‖Ga and it is shown in Figure 10(e). After the onset
attack event bi followed by inserted event b, the supervisor
“thinks” that the system is in state 3; however, the system
is in state 2. Then, the supervisor enables event c and the
plant can reach an unsafe state.
8 General approach for detection of attacks
Our strategy for detection and mitigation of sensor attacks
is the same as that for AE-attacks, described in Section 5.
The intrusion detection module monitors the output from the
plant and notifies the supervisor when an attack has been de-
tected. The supervisor, upon receiving an attack report from
the intrusion detection module, switches to a safe mode of
operation where it disables all controllable events. Hereafter,
we generalize the property of AE-safe controllability to a
general form that captures, in a unified manner, AE-, SE-,
and SI-attacks. Then we discuss its verification.
8.1 General form of safe controllability
We defined in Section 5.2 AE-safe controllability, which en-
sures that AE-attacks can be detected in time to avoid reach-
ing an unsafe state, under the attack and defense strategies
considered in this paper. We now generalize AE-safe con-
trollability to a General Form termed GF-Safe Controllabil-
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Fig. 10. Figures of Example 6
ity. To avoid ambiguity, we denoted the event set of GM as
EM and specify it in each case.
Definition 3 (GF-Safe Controllability) Consider GM =
(XM , EM , fM , x0,M ) a model of one type of attacks (AE,
SE, or SI). Language LM = L(GM ) is GF-safe controllable
with respect to projection PMo : E
∗
M → E∗o , set of vulnera-
ble events Ef , and unsafe states XMf if (∀s ∈ Ψ(Ef ))(∀t ∈
LM/s, t ∈ E∗M ) [(fM (xo, st) ∩ XMf 6= ∅) ∧ (∀s′ <
st, fM (xo, s
′)∩XMf = ∅)]⇒ (∃t1, t2 ∈ E∗M )[(t = t1t2)∧(
(@ω ∈ LM )[PMo (st1) = PMo (ω) ∧ Eao,v /∈ ω]
) ∧ (Ec ∈
t2)].
Comparing Definitions 1 and 3, we see that by replacing
PMo and Ef by P
a
o and E
a
c,v , respectively, then GF-safe
controllability reduces to AE-safe controllability. GF-safe
controllability allows us to address SE-attacks and SI-attacks
as well. For SE-attacks, GM is obtained using Algorithm 4,
as shown in Section 6, where EM = E ∪ Eao,v , projection
PMo is P
M
o : (E ∪ Eao,v)∗ → E∗M,o, and Ef is the set of
erased sensor events Eao,v . For SE-attacks, GM is obtained
using Algorithm 5, where EM = E ∪Eio,v , projection PMo
is PMo : (E ∪ Eio,v)∗ → E∗M,o, and Ef is the set of onset
attack events Eio,v . We will refer to GF-safe controllability
for SE- and SI-attacks as SE-safe controllability and SI-safe
controllability, respectively.
Clearly, Theorem 1 generalizes to the case of SE- and SI-
attacks, using SE-safe controllability and SI-safe controlla-
bility, respectively, since once the modified model GM that
accounts for attacks has been built, then the conditions for
avoiding unsafe states boil down to the same cases in each
attack type.
8.2 Test of GF-Safe Controllability
To test if a system is GF-safe controllable, we generalize
Algorithm 2 to Algorithm 6. This algorithm verifies if the
intrusion detection module can detect any attack before the
plant reaches an unsafe state and if the supervisor can disable
events to prevent the plant from reachingXf . Here, the label
automaton to use for building the diagnoser is parametrized
by Ef , as shown in Figure 11. In step 1 of Algorithm 6,
N Y
Ef
Ef
Fig. 11. Label automaton AGF`
we select which attack we want to analyze. After that, we
follow the same steps as in Algorithm 2. For the sake of
brevity, we omit explaining each step. We note that in the
algorithm, q↓x := {x : (∃l)[(x, l) ∈ q]} is the projection of
q to the set of corresponding GM states.
Proposition 4 Let GM = (XM , Ea, fM , x0,M ) be ob-
tained from one of Algorithms 1, 4, 5 presented earlier,
and let automaton Gd be the diagnoser built in Algorithm
6. Language LM is not GF-safe controllable with respect
to PMo , Ef , and X
M
f if and only if one of the following
conditions holds true:
(1) There exists qY N = {(xi1 , `i1), . . . , (xin , `in)} ∈
QY N such that ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xij ∈ XMf and
`ij = Y .
(2) There exists qY = {(xi1 , Y ), . . . , (xin , Y )} ∈ FC
such that ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xij ∈ XMf .
(3) There exists xM ∈ Xuc such that xM ∈ XMf , where
Xuc is defined in Algorithm 6.
Proof: The proof follows the same steps as the proof of
Proposition 1.
Remark 2 A test of GF-safe controllability using verifiers
can be obtained in a straightforward manner by suitably
adapting Algorithm 3 to the different attack cases. We omit
the details.
Example 7 Let us consider again Example 4, whose diag-
noser Gd built according to Algorithm 6 is drawn in Figure
12 considering Eao,v = {ba}. By examining the diagnoser
states, we see that the attack guides the system to unsafe state
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Algorithm 6 GF-safe controllability test
Inputs:
• GM = (XM , EM , fM , x0,M ): closed-loop system
subject to AE-attacks, SE-attacks or SI-attacks
• XMf : set of unsafe states in GM
• Ef ∈ {Eac,v, Eao,v, Eio,v}
• AttackMode ∈ {AE,SE, SI}
Output: GFSafeControllability ∈ {true, false}
1: if AttackMode=AE then
2: Ef = Eac,v
3: else
4: if AttackMode=SE then
5: Ef = Eao,v
6: else
7: Ef = Eio,v
8: Build G` = GM ||AGF` where AGF` is shown in Figure
11
9: Compute diagnoser Gd = Obs(G`, EM,uo), where
EM,uo = Euo∪D(Ec,v ∩Euo) if AttackMode is AE,
otherwise EM,uo = Euo ∪ Ef
10: Verify for all uncertain states qY N =
{(xi1 , `i1), . . . (xin , `in)} ∈ Xd, where xik ∈ XH ×X
and `ik ∈ {Y,N}, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} if ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that xij ∈ XMf
11: if there is uncertain state q = {(xi1 , `i1), . . . , (xin , `in)}∈ QY N in which there exists xij ∈ XMf then
12: GFSafeControllability = false
13: else Compute FC according to Definition 2
14: if there is q = {(xi1 , Y ), . . . , (xin , Y )} ∈ FC in
which there exists xij ∈ XMf then
15: GFSafeControllability = false
16: else
17: Compute
Xuc =
⋃
q∈FC
⋃
xM∈q↓x
Reach(GM , xM , EM,uc),
where
18: if AttackMode=AE then
19: EM,uc = Euc ∪ Eac,v
20: else
21: if AttackMode=SE then
22: EM,uc = Euc ∪D(Eo,v ∩ Euc)
23: else
24: EM,uc = Euc ∪ Eio,v
25: if Xuc ∩XMf 6= ∅ then
26: GFSafeControllability = false
27: else GFSafeControllability = true
Xf = {5}, and the state {((3, 3)N), ((3, 5)Y )} is an uncer-
tain state. Thus, the system under SE-attack represented in
Figure 8(a) is not SE-safe controllable with respect to PMo ,
Eao,v and Xf .
Consider now Example 6, where the closed-loop system un-
der SI-attacks is shown in Figure 10(e). We follow Algo-
rithm 6 to test if the language generated by this GM is SI-
{(1,1),N)}
{((2,2),N),((2,4),F)}
a
{((3,3),N),((3,5),Y)}
c
Fig. 12. Automaton Gd for Example 4: SE-attack
safe controllable. The diagnoser Gd for this case is drawn
in Figure 13. By examining the diagnoser states, we notice
that the attack will not be detected by the diagnoser and the
system will reach unsafe stateXf = {5}. Thus, the system is
not SI-safe controllable with respect to PMo , E
i
o,v and Xf .
{((1,1),N)}
{((2,2),N),((2,xb),Y)}
a
b
{((3,3),N),((3,2),Y)}
{((4,4),N),((4,5),Y)}
c
Fig. 13. Automaton Gd for Example 6: SI-attack
Remark 3 After testing GF-safe controllability, it may also
be necessary to test if the new closed-loop system has a
deadlock in the case of SE- or SI-attacks; recall Example 5
(a similar example can be constructed for SI-attacks).
8.3 Combinations of attacks
So far, for the sake of simplicity of presentation, we have
considered attacks of a single type. However, our method-
ology is general and combinations of attacks can be studied
by overlapping the modeling approaches of each attack in
the construction of GM , via Ga and Ha. As illustration, we
sketch a modification to Example 4 which requires a com-
bination attack to bring the system to an unsafe state. Make
event b controllable. Add a new state 6 and a controllable
and observable event d that takes state 3 to 6. Also replace
event c that takes state 4 to 5 with event d. Now erasure of b
alone will not produce a successful attack, but the combina-
tion of sensor erasure of b and insertion of c at state 2 will
be successful. The details are straightforward and omitted
here. Notice that, for the combination of AE- and SE- at-
tacks, we need to adjust the superscripts of the two dilations
for AE- and SE- attacks since we used the same superscript
“a” for each, but with a different meaning in each individ-
ual case. In AE-attacks, the event that was created by the
dilation is uncontrollable whereas, in SE-attacks, it is un-
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observable. Therefore, when considering a combination of
these two attacks, one should use two different superscripts.
In addition, the construction of GM could also be altered
to model attackers that do not attack at every opportunity,
assuming some knowledge of the attack model in terms of
the state spaces ofG andH . How to acquire such knowledge
is an interesting problem for future research, but one that is
likely to be application-dependent.
9 Traffic control system example
As a more comprehensive example than the illustrative ones
presented so far, let us consider an attack on a traffic con-
trol system taken from Wonham (2013) and often used in
the literature. The problem consists of two vehicles a and b
that must travel from the origin to the destination through a
single one-way road. The road is partitioned into four sec-
tions. Denote by ai the events corresponding to vehicle a
entering section Si, i = 1, . . . , 5, where S5 is the destina-
tion. Similarly, we have events bi for vehicle b. The plant
behavior is modeled by G = Gva||Gvb, where Gva and
Gvb are such that L(Gva) = {a1a2a3a4a5} and L(Gvb) =
{b1b2b3b4b5}. Traffic lights and vehicle detectors are in-
stalled at section junctions. The traffic lights are placed at
the entrances of sections 1, 2, and 4, and the vehicle de-
tectors are located at the entrances of sections 1, 3, 4, and
at the destination. Thus, Ec = {a1, b1, a2, b2, a4, b4} and
Eo = {a1, b1, a3, b3, a4, b4, a5, b5}. The goal is that the two
vehicles must reach the destination without colliding, which
is achieved by preventing both vehicles from occupying the
same road section simultaneously. The unsafe states are thus
the states where vehicles a and b are in the same section; i.e.,
Xf = {(i, i)}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. For this example, we com-
puted a supervisor SP that satisfies this safety specification.
The realization of SP was obtained as follows: (i) states
(2,1) and (1,2) were deleted to satisfy the control specifica-
tion and the property of observability; (ii) the supremal con-
trollable sublanguage was then computed; (iii) the resulting
language was verified to be observable; (iv) the realization
of SP was obtained in the standard manner (pp.186, Cas-
sandras and Lafortune (2008)). This procedure was chosen
as it results in a closed-loop language that is strictly larger
than the supremal controllable normal sublanguage of the
specification language.
In Carvalho et al. (2016), we presented an AE-attack on this
traffic control system. A summary of those results is pro-
vided in the Appendix for completeness. Herein, we present
SE- and SI-attacks.
Let the set of vulnerable sensor events to SE-attacks be
Eo,v = {a3, b3} ⊆ Eo. Therefore, the set of attacked sensor
events is Eao,v = {aa3 , ba3}. Following Algortihm 4, we ob-
tain the closed-loop system GM under attacks depicted in
Figure 14. We can see that, after attack, the system does not
reach unsafe states, but deadlocks at one of the following
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b2
(0, 2)
b3
(0, 3)
b4
(0, 4)
b5
(0, 5)
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(4, 0)
a4
b1
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(3, 4)
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(3, 5)
b5
(3, 0)aa3
ba3
(4, 3)
ba3
(5, 3)
a5
aa3
Fig. 14. The closed-loop system GM under SE-attack. The state
labels only show the state of plant G.
states: (0, 3), (3, 0), (5, 3), and (3, 5). Next, we test if the
system is SE-safe controllable by following Algorithm 6. It
can be seen that the system is SE-safe controllable in this
case since no unsafe states are reachable in GM and, thus
Xuc ∩XMf = ∅.
Let us now consider an SI-attack where the set of vul-
nerable sensor events is Eo,v = {a4, b4} ⊆ Eo. Thus,
Eio,v = {ai4, bi4}. Following Algorithm 5, we obtain the
closed-loop system GM under attack depicted in Figure 15,
where it can be seen that the system has reaches unsafe state
(3, 3). In addition, it can be seen that the intrusion detection
module cannot detect the SI-attack; for example, trace
b1b2b3b
i
4b4a1a2a3 has the same projection as b1b2b3b4a1a2a3.
Therefore, the system is not SI-safe controllable.
10 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of intrusion detection and
mitigation in supervisory control systems, where the attacker
can either enable or disable vulnerable actuator events and
can erase or insert vulnerable sensor events. We presented a
general methodology for modeling and analysis of the cases
of AE-, SE- and SI-attacks. To prevent damage from attacks,
we proposed a mechanism to detect them online; upon detec-
tion, we considered the conservative approach of switching
to a safe mode of operation, where all controllable events
are disabled. We defined the properties of AE-, SE- and SI-
safe controllability that the system should satisfy in order to
successfully prevent damage from AE-, SE- and SI-attacks,
respectively. These three properties were cast as three cases
of the general form of safe-controllability, GF-safe control-
lability. We developed two algorithms to test whether a sys-
tem is AE-safe controllable or not, using diagnoser or veri-
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Fig. 15. The closed-loop system GM under SI-attack. The state
labels only show the state of plant G.
fier automata. We generalized the diagnoser-based algorithm
to the case of GF-safe controllablilty.
Many problems are of interest for future investigations, such
as, more detailed analyses of combinations of attacks, dif-
ferent attack, or different information structure for the at-
tacker. Extensions to other response modes from the super-
visor are certainly worthy of investigation. The case where
damage can be prevented after detection of an attack when
the supervisor does not disable all controllable events can
be approached as a supervisory control problem for a mod-
ified specification. Such types of supervisory control prob-
lems have been considered in other published works, e.g.,
on multi-modal control problems (Faraut et al., 2009) and
the so-called reconfiguration supervisor (Nooruldeen and
Schmidt, 2015).
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A AE-attack exemple
We will now analyze AE-safe controllability. To this end, we
consider the same traffic control system as in Section 9. We
assume that the set of vulnerable actuator events is Ec,v =
{a2, b2} ⊆ Ec, and thus, the set of attacked actuator events
is Eac,v = {aa2 , ba2}.
Following Algorithm 1, we construct, in step 1, automa-
ton Ga that models the plant under AE-attacks which
is obtained by adding transitions labeled with events in
Eac,v = {aa2 , ba2} in parallel with the transitions labeled with
the corresponding events in Ec,v = {a2, b2}. In step 2, we
build the realization of the supervisor under AE-attacks by
adding a self-loop at every state for each event in Eac,v and
Ea,uc = {a3, b3, a5, b5}. Finally, in step 3, we construct
the closed-loop system GM under attacks, as depicted in
Figure A.1. We can see that, after attack aa2 , the closed-loop
system may reach unsafe states such as state (3, 3). Next,
with GM being built, we use Algorithm 2 to test if the sys-
tem is AE-safe controllable. We show in Figure A.2 part of
the diagnoser with respect to Eac,v built in accordance with
Algorithm 2. It can be seen in Figure A.2 that a string s with
projection P ao (s) = a1a3b1 reaches uncertain diagnoser
state {((11, (3, 1)), N), ((11, (3, 2)), Y )}, which surely un-
controllably reaches unsafe state {((11, (3, 3)), Y )} via
event b3 ∈ Euc. Hence, the supervisor cannot prevent
the plant from reaching an unsafe state after the attack is
detected. The system is not AE-safe controllable.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Let us denote the conclusion clauses in Definition 1
by SC1 := (@ω ∈ LM )[P ao (st1) = P ao (ω)∧Eac,v /∈ ω] and
SC2 := (Ec ∈ t2). We first prove the “if” statement.
(1) Assume there exists qY N ∈ QY N such that xij ∈
XMf and `ij = Y for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then,
there exists sd ∈ L(Gd) such that fd(q0,d, sd) = qY N .
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Fig. A.1. The closed-loop system GM = Ha‖Ga under attack.
The state labels only show the state of Ga.
{(0,(0,0)),N}
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a1
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a4
a4
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Fig. A.2. A part of diagnoser Gd.
Thus, there exist sY , sN ∈ LM such that P ao (sY ) =
P ao (sN ) = sd, fM (x0,M , sY ) = xij , E
a
c,v ∈ sY and
Eac,v /∈ sN . Let sY = st, where s ∈ Ψ(Eac,v) and
t ∈ LM/s. Finally, set ω = sN ∈ LM ; we will have
P ao (st) = P
a
o (ω) and E
a
c,v /∈ ω, which violates clause
SC1 for all decompositions of t = t1t2.
(2) Let qY ∈ FC such that xij ∈ XMf for some j ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Then, there exists sd ∈ L(Gd) such that
fd(q0,d, sd) = qY and sd = s′dσo, where σo ∈ Ea,o.
Thus, there exists sY ∈ LM such that fM (x0,M , sY ) =
xij ∈ XMf , P ao (sY ) = sd and Eac,v ∈ sY . Let sY =
s1s2s3, where s1 ∈ Ψ(Eac,v), s2s3 ∈ LM/s1 and s3 =
σ0. Taking s = s1 and t = s2s3, we must select t1 =
s2s3 to satisfy SC1, which violates SC2 since it forces
t2 = ε.
(3) Let sY = st1t2, where st1 = s1s2s3 as defined in
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case 2) to enforce SC1. Due to the definition of Xuc
in Algorithm 2, t2 ∈ (Euc ∪ Eac,v)∗ ∩ LM/st1. Then,
Ea,c 6∈ t2, which violates clause SC2 when we enforce
SC1. That is, there is no decomposition of t = t1t2
that satisfies both SC1 and SC2.
We now prove the “only if” part by contrapositive. Sup-
pose that statements 1, 2 and 3 are all false. This im-
plies that (i) there does not exist an uncertain state
qY N = {(xi1 , `i1), . . . , (xin , `in)} ∈ Qd such that
xij ∈ XMf and (ii) there does not exist a first entered cer-
tain state qY = {(xi1 , Y ), . . . , (xin , Y )} ∈ FC such that
xij ∈ XMf ; and (iii) there does not exist a state xM ∈ Xuc
such that xM ∈ XMf . Taken together, statements (i), (ii),
and (iii) imply that either the antecedent of SC1 ∧ SC2
in Definition 1 is false, or, if it is true, then both SC1 and
SC2 are true for some decomposition of t as t = t1t2.
Hence, LM is AE-safe controllable.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: We consider here the same clauses SC1 and SC2
of Definition 1 as in the proof of Proposition 1. The set of
events of the automata in Algorithm 3 are shown in Table
C.1 to help to following the proof.
(⇐)
(1) This part is similar to case 1 of Proposition 1. If
there exists xV = {(xN , N), (x, Y )} ∈ XV such
that x ∈ XMf , then, there exists sV ∈ L(GV )
such that fV (x0,V , sV ) = xV . Thus, there exist
sY ∈ L(GF ) and sN ∈ L(GN ) such thatP (sV ) = sY ,
PR(sV ) = sN , fF (x0,F , sY ) = (x, Y ), Ef ∈ sY
and Ef 6∈ sN , where P : (Ea ∪ ER)∗ → E∗a and
PR : (Ea ∪ ER)∗ → E∗R. Since GF and G˜N (de-
fined in Algorithm 1 in (Moreira et al., 2011)) are
subautomata of GM and GN is obtained from G˜N by
renaming the unobservable events, then sY ∈ LM ,
sN = R(s˜N ) and s˜N ∈ LM . Finally, setting
sY = st ∈ LM and ω = s˜N , then by the construction
of GV , P ao (st) = P
a
o (ω), which violates clause SC1
for all decompositions of t = t1t2.
(2) This case follows the same ideas as cases 2 and 3 of
Proposition 1. If there exists xT = {xcdV , (x, `)} ∈ XT
such that xcdV = A and x ∈ XMf , then, there exists
sT ∈ L(GT ) such that fT (x0,T , sT ) = xT . Thus, there
exists scdV ∈ L(GcdV ) and sY ∈ L(GF ) such that sT ∈
{scdV } ∩ P−1(sY ), where P : (Ea ∪ ER)∗ → E∗a . By
construction of automaton GcdV , s
cd
V = sV σosuc where
sV ∈ L(GV ), σo ∈ Ea,o and suc ∈ (Euc ∪ Eac,v)∗.
Since sV ∈ L(GV ), thus, there exists s′Y = s1s2 ∈
LM such that s1 ∈ Ψ(Ef ), s1s2 ∈ P [L(GV )] and
P (sV ) = s
′
Y . Let sV σo ∈ L(GV )Ea,o ∩P−1[L(GF )]
and define s = s1 and set t1 = s2σo in order to satisfy
SC1. Since sT ∈ {sV σosuc}∩P−1(sY ), i.e., sT tracks
Table C.1
Set of events of automata in Algorithm 3
Automaton Set of events
Gm Ea
GF Ea
GN EN
GV Ea ∪ ER
GcdV Ea ∪ ER
GT Ea ∪ ER
the trace sY that has after sV σo only uncontrollable
events, thus, t2 = suc, which violates clause SC2.
(⇒) Proof by contrapositive. Suppose the statements 1 and
2 are both false. This implies that: (i) there does not exist
xV = {(xN , N), (x, Y )} ∈ XV such that x ∈ XMf ; and (ii)
there does not exist {xcdV , (x, Y )} ∈ XT such that xcdV = A
and x ∈ XMf . Statement (i) and (ii) imply that either the
antecedent in Definition 1 is false, or if it is true, then both
SC1 and SC2 are true, where t1 is chosen to match fault de-
tection (when A is entered). Hence, LM is safe controllable.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Let Ha be the automaton obtained in Algorithm 1
representing the all-out attacker. The associated closed-loop
language is LAA = L(Ha) ∩ L(Ga). Assume that H ′a is
the automaton that models the attacker that does not at-
tack at all times. Note that H ′a can be represented as a
subautomaton of Ha subject to state splitting. Therefore,
we have L(H ′a) ⊆ L(Ha), which implies that LSA =L(H ′a) ∩ L(Ga) ⊆ L(Ha) ∩ L(Ga) = LAA.
To prove by contradiction, assume that LAA is AE-safe con-
trollable but LSA is not AE-safe controllable. Then, there
exists a string st ∈ LSA that reaches an unsafe state, where
the last event of s is in Eac,v and ∀t1, t2 such that t = t1t2
we do not have both Ec ∈ t2 and (@ω ∈ LM )(Po(st1) =
Po(ω) ∧ Eac,v 6∈ ω). Because LSA ⊆ LAA, the same st
is also in LAA contradicting the AE-safe controllability of
LAA. Therefore, LSA must be AE-safe controllable.
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